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von Mehren and Trautman: Constitutional Control of Choice of Law: Some Reflections on Hagu

CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROL OF CHOICE

OF LAW: SOME REFLECTIONS ON HAGUE
Arthur T. von Mehren* & Donald T. Trautman**
The Supreme Court's decision in Allstate Insurance Co. v.
Hague1 is, in several respects, unusual. The decision is so inconclusive on the subject matter it considers that one wonders why the
Court, with so much to do, bothered to take the case. Once it heard
argument and learned that the division on the Court was such that it
could not contribute to the law on the subject, one wonders why it
did not dismiss the writ of certiorari as being improvidently granted.
This article examines both the reasons why the Court's action was so
unhelpful and the courses of action open to it that might have been
more fruitful.
ISSUES IN Hague

The decision itself is at best fair warning to the profession that
the Court continues to have little to contribute to the subject of constitutional control of choice of law.' Seven of the eight Justices who
took part in the decision of the case' agreed that application of Minnesota law to the issue on which the case turned would be unconstitutional if Minnesota "had no significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, with the parties and
the occurrence or transaction."' 4 The four Justices who comprised the
* Story Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. B.S., 1942, LL.B., 1945, Ph.D., 1946,
Harvard University.
** Shattuck Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. A.B., 1951, LL.B., 1951, Harvard
University.
1. 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
2. The Court's last decision on the subject, Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179
(1964), had already conveyed that message.
3. Justice Brennan wrote the Court's opinion, in which Justices White, Marshall and
Blackmun joined. 449 U.S. at 304. Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment. Id. at 320.
Justice Powell wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist
joined. Id. at 332. Justice Stewart took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Id.
at 320.
4. 449 U.S. at 308.
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plurality concluded that the required contacts were present; Justice
Stevens, who concurred, 5 and the three dissenters disagreed. Despite
this near unanimity on the proposition that Minnesota could not apply her law unless she had some significant contact with the matter,
none of the three opinions states clearly the precise substantive issue
for which a choice of law was required.
We can only speculate as to why the Justices were silent on this
issue. As a preliminary to such speculation, it is useful to state the
substantive issue on which the Hague case turned. The point is simple: Was Condition 7 of Section II of the insurance policy issued by
Allstate to the deceased valid? The language of Condition 7 embodies the understandable proposition that where there is multiple coverage for the same risk, the insurer's liability under each coverage is
reduced to a proportional contribution to a fund created by pooling
all such coverages. 6 The consequence in the Hague context is to prevent the aggregation of the insured's multiple uninsured motorist
coverages.
The insured in Hague had extended his policy to provide an uninsured motorist coverage of $15,000 per person and $30,000 per accident for each of his three cars. Condition 7 placed a ceiling of
$15,000 per person on the insurer's total possible liability under
these coverages and thus prevented the aggregation or "stacking" of
the three coverages to provide for a possible total coverage of
$45,000 per person.
As a matter of general contract law, Condition 7 is plainly a
part of the insurance agreement. The question remains, however,
whether the Condition is valid under the statutes that regulated the
writing of the insurance. Some states, including Wisconsin, interpret
their statutes to permit such antistacking provisions;7 a larger number of states, including Minnesota, reach the opposite result under
5. Justice Stevens wrote that "there is little in this record other than the presumption in
favor of the forum's own law to support" the application of Minnesota law. 449 U.S. at 331-32
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
6. That Condition provided, inter alia, that
if the insured has other similar insurance available to him and applicable to the
accident, the damages shall be deemed not to exceed the higher of the applicable
limits of liability of this insurance and such other insurance, and Allstate shall not
be liable for a greater proportion of any loss to which this coverage applies than the
limit of liability hereunder bears to the sum of the applicable limits of liability of
this insurance and such other insurance.
Allstate Ins. Co., Standard Policy 6 (copy on file in office of Hofstra Law Review).
7. See Nelson v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 63 Wis. 2d 558, 217 N.W.2d 670 (1974).
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their statutes.8 Since 1971 all insurance coverage written in Wisconsin was required to include uninsured motorist coverage; an insured
could, if he wished, pay an additional premium and raise the uninsured-motorist-coverage limits up to the bodily-injury-liability
limits.9
The issue of the validity of Condition 7 in Mr. Hague's insurance policy arose in the following circumstances: Hague, a resident
and domiciliary of Wisconsin, died of injuries suffered when a motorcycle on which he was a passenger was struck from behind by an
automobile. The accident occurred in Wisconsin, immediately across
the border from Red Wing, Minnesota, where Hague had been employed for the past fifteen years and to which he had commuted
daily from his Wisconsin home. The operators of both vehicles were
Wisconsin residents; neither carried insurance.
After the accident but before the present litigation was initiated, Hague's wife moved to Red Wing. Subsequently, she married a
Minnesota resident and lived with him in Minnesota. The Minnesota
Registrar of Probate appointed Hague's widow personal representative for his estate. In that capacity, she brought an action against
Allstate to recover $45,000, representing an aggregation of the three
$15,000 coverages contained in her late husband's insurance policy
with Allstate.10
Allstate argued that Condition 7 did not permit such aggregation so that its liability was limited to $15,000. Hague's widow
contended that the Minnesota statute, which had been interpreted as
prohibiting antistacking clauses, was applicable as a matter of choice
of law. The Minnesota Supreme Court accepted her argument."1
Certiorari was granted and, in due course, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment below.
BURDENS ON THE COURT

The Supreme Court's extreme reluctance to exercise constitutional control over state choice-of-law practices has long been clear
8.
(1973).

See Van Tassel v. Horace Mann Mut. Ins. Co., 296 Minn. 181, 207 N.W.2d 348

9. Nelson v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 63 Wis. 2d 558, 563 n.l, 217 N.W.2d 670, 672
n.1 (1974). It is interesting to note that neither the opinions in the Supreme Court nor those

below indicated what extra premium would have been charged Mr. Hague had he wished to
increase his uninsured-motorist-coverage limits.
10. 449 U.S. at 305.
11. Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., 289 N.W. 2d 43, aff'd on rehearing,id. at 50 (Minn.
1979).
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and is understandable. This reluctance, based no doubt in considerable measure on a desire to avoid the heavy burdens that full-scale
involvement with this intractable subject matter would entail, has
become greater as functional or instrumental methods have increasingly replaced more mechanical approaches to the choice-of-law
problem.12 Indeed, it has even been argued that the only realistic
position for the Supreme Court to take in the contemporary situation
is that neither full faith and credit nor due process prevents a state
from applying its own law even though no principled and coherent
choice-of-law method can justify this choice. This view is taken by
Justice Stevens.3 The choice of forum law need not be rational or
principled; it need only "not frustrate the reasonable expectations of
the contracting parties" and not result in any "fundamental unfairness." 14 For Justice Stevens, "[tihe choice-of-law decision of the
Minnesota courts is consistent with due process because it does not
result in unfairness to either litigant, not because Minnesota now has
resident or formerly had an interest in
an interest in the plaintiff as
15
the decedent as employee.
There is much to be said on both sides of the issue whether the
Supreme Court should relinquish direct constitutional control over
state choice of law to the extent that Justice Stevens proposes. Such
a discussion would require a full-length Article. For present purposes, it is enough to suggest that, while on the one hand federalsystem considerations support the development of significant federal
control over choice of law, on the other, especially in view of the
great difficulties that contemporary choice-of-law methodology
encounters in developing dispositive rules,"' the conscientious administration of full-scale controls, at least under present institutional
arrangements,"' could place a significant-perhaps an intolerable-burden on the Supreme Court.
12.

For a general discussion, see von Mehren, Recent Trends in Choice-of-Law Method-

ology, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 927 (1975).
13. Justice Stevens can, indeed, be read as allowing the choice of the law of any jurisdic-

tion in which Allstate did business and in which the insured might have been expected to drive
at some time. See 449 U.S. at 329-32 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
14.
15.
16.

Id. at 330-31 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 331 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
See Reese, Choice of Law: Rules or Approach, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 315 (1972).

17.

Under present arrangements, a significant proportion of choice-of-law questions

come to the Supreme Court directly from the highest court of a state. Accordingly, in many

cases the Court would not have the benefit of prior consideration of the problem by the lower
federal courts.
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Justice Stevens' position is unprecedented and will seem too extreme to those who understand the federal dimensions of the choiceof-law problem."' The language of both the plurality and the dissenting opinions, although not the result reached by the plurality, accepts minimal federal control at least over essentially arbitrary
choice-of-law practices.
ARBITRARY OR REASONABLE?

Results can be fairly described as arbitrary when they cannot be
explained in a coherent and principled manner on the basis of an
acceptable intellectual system. What is arbitrary from the perspective of one intellectual system may, of course, be reasonable from
that of another. Whether Minnesota's choice of law in the Hague
case was arbitrary depends, therefore, on whether there is any intellectual system that can explain in a principled and coherent fashion
the application of Minnesota law in Hague; and, if so, whether such
a system is constitutionally acceptable.
The first question is appropriately considered against the background of American thinking respecting the choice-of-law problem.
At least three general approaches or theories are encountered in
American practice. The first views choice of law in terms of broad
policies respecting the requirements of social and economic intercourse among states. Thus, at an early stage in the development of
American conflicts theory, Joseph Story wrote in his Conflict of
Laws that
[t]he true foundation, on which the administration of international
law must rest, is that the rules, which are to govern, are those,
which arise from mutual interest and utility, from a sense of the
inconveniences, which would result from a contrary doctrine, and
from a sort of moral necessity to do justice, in order that justice
may be done to us in return.1 9

A second American school of conflicts thinking is associated
with Professor Beale and the first Restatement of Conflict of Laws. 20
18. Historically, Justice Stevens' position has not attracted much of a following; however, occasionally in result, if not in reasoning, his view may have been approached as, for
example, by Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court in Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955),
and in a related area by Justice Black in his separate opinion in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 322 (1945) (Black, J.).
19. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 35, at 30 (7th ed. E.
Bennett 1872) (Ist ed. Boston 1834) (footnote omitted).

20. See generally J.

BEALE, TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
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This school, which sought to provide a relatively simple system in
which forum shopping would be discouraged so far as possible, based
its solutions largely on the proposition that the territorial nature of
substantive law is decisive for choice of law. 21 It had the vision of the
international community as a well-defined checkerboard with each
state's law confined within that state's boundaries; moreover, each
situation or transacton was thought to be firmly centered on one
square so that overlapping would never occur.
A third school proceeds from the premise that legal rules reflect
policies and, accordingly, whether they apply depends on a rational
basis, in view of the connections between the circumstances and the
rule's legal order, for invoking the policy in the multistate situation
presented.2 2 This approach, which has its intellectual roots in the
writings of Walter Wheeler Cook and David Cavers in the 1920s
and 1930S,23 has dominated American conflicts methodology since
the early 1960s. This school's instrumental methodology leaves various questions open. One particularly difficult question is how the degree, as distinguished from the existence, of concern is to be evaluated and how so-called true conflicts are to be resolved. 24 But the
theory's basic premise is widely accepted today: It is arbitrary for a
legal order to apply a legal rule in a given case unless the contacts
between that legal order and the transaction or occurrence are such
that there is a reason, in view of the policies related to the rule, to
apply it to the particular issue presented.
Would one or several of these methodologies view Minnesota's
choice of law in Hague as reasonable? Or would all conclude that it
MENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934).

21.

RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 7, at 11-13 (1934).

22. This approach is rejected by orthodox continental European theory, which is, methodologically speaking, much closer to the first Restatement. E.g., Kegel, PaternalHome and
Dream Home: TraditionalConflict of Laws and the American Reformers, 27 AM. J. COMP. L.
615 (1979). But see, e.g., Audit, A Continental Lawyer Looks at Contemporary American
Choice-of-Law Principles, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 589 (1979). In all events, the emergence in

contemporary European conflicts theory of "unilateral choice-of-law rules" and the conception
of "spatially conditioned rules" probably reflects some of the assumptions and considerations
that have in recent decades guided American thinking respecting choice-of-law methodology.
See, e.g., von Mehren, Comments, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 605 (1979). But the displacement in
European thinking of the traditional method is only partial and could ultimately prove
unacceptable.
23.

See generally W. COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF

LAWS (1942); Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REV. 173
(1933). For a survey of the development of choice-of-law theory, see von Mehren, supra note
12, at 928-41.
24. See von Mehren, supra note 12, at 936-41, 952-63.
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was arbitrary?
No argument seems available to support the proposition that the
choice of Minnesota law in Hague is respectful of mutual interest
and utility or is acceptable in terms of broad policies respecting the
requirements of social and economic intercourse among states. For
Story, territorial considerations played a large role in determining
mutual interest and utility. Thus he wrote that "A state may...
regulate . . . the validity of contracts and other acts, done within it;
[and] the resulting rights and duties growing out of these contracts
and acts . .. 15 His approach counseled self-restraint and mutual
respect; he would certainly have found Minnesota's choice of law in
Hague self-serving and not in the mutual interest.
The choice of law in Hague fares no better when tested in terms
of the territorial criteria on which Beale and the first Restatement
put such great weight. 26 The crucial events-taking out the insurance policy and the accident that gave rise to a claim under that
policy-all occurred in Wisconsin. It would seem an impossible task
to analyze the Hague case in first Restatement terms in such a way
as to conclude that the decision was not arbitrary and unprincipled.
Is then the Hague result also arbitrary when tested in terms of
an instrumental methodology? An essential characteristic of all
instrumental analyses is that they, unlike the jurisdiction-selecting
approach embodied in the first Restatement, do not approach the
choice-of-law problem as requiring the selection of one governing
law for all issues that arise from a given transaction or occurrence.
Instead, choice of law proceeds issue by issue. Thus, the second
Restatement states that
(1) The rights and duties of the parties with respect to an issue in
contract are determined by the local law of the state which, with
respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the
transaction and the parties.
(2) . . . These contacts are to be evaluated according to their rela27
tive importance with respect to the particular issue.
Section 145, which sets out the general principle for choice of law
for torts, uses the same formula: "[the local law of the state which,
with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the
25.

J. STORY, supra note 19, § 18.

26. See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 7 (1934).
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (1971) (emphasis added).
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occurrence and the parties."2
In the circumstances of the Hague case, an instrumental methodology asks, therefore, whether Minnesota has any principled basis
for invoking its statutory prohibition of contract provisions like those
of Condition 7 in Hague's policy against aggregating or stacking uninsured motorist coverages. Condition 7 of the policy was presumably designed to clarify the ambiguity that would otherwise exist as to
the extent of the insurance company's exposure through the uninsured motorist coverage. Particularly where the stacking issue relates
to uninsured motorist coverage contained in a single policy, the relation between that issue and the cost of the coverage seems clear. It
should also be kept in mind that the insured in Hague could, by
paying a larger premium, have raised his uninsured motorist coverage up to the bodily injury liability coverage that he carried.29
The effect of the Minnesota statutory prohibition of antistacking provisions is, therefore, to provide insureds who take out two or
more insured motorist coverages in a single policy with higher coverage-which presumably will cause insurance companies to demand
higher premiums.30
Two arguments can be advanced for a statutory prohibition of
antistacking clauses in insurance contracts. The first is paternalistic:
Individuals need, and should carry, more rather than less protection
against the risk in question. In essence, the philosophy is the same as
that which justifies requiring, as Wisconsin does, a motorist to carry
uninsured motorist coverage. The second argument views insurance
contracts as unnegotiated, obscure documents. As the typical insured
will not fully understand the details of the coverage he is purchasing,
the possibility of surprise should be reduced where possible. Accordingly, complex and ambiguous situations are to be definitively resolved in favor of the insured, at least where the resulting increase in
premium cost is presumably small.
Does either the paternalistic or the consumer-oriented policy
that can justify Minnesota's rule against antistacking provisions in
28. Id. § 145.
29. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
30. The same effect is produced where an insured takes out uninsured motorist coverage
in separate policies, covering different cars.
The stacking problem can also arise in a more indirect and contingent fashion where the
insured seeks to benefit by aggregating a coverage in his policy and one in a policy issued to a
third person. An antistacking clause should reduce the cost of uninsured motorist coverage for
these situations and thus produce a lower premium for the insured than would be the case
were stacking permitted by his policy.
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insurance contracts rationally reach the insured in the circumstances
of the Hague case? The only connection or relation that could rationally connect these Minnesota policies with the Hague situation is
Hague's having worked for some fifteen years in Minnesota and
commuted from his home in Wisconsin to his place of work in Minnesota. But it is hard to see how this connection with Minnesota
grounds either the paternalistic or the consumer-protection policy
that is the basis of the Minnesota rule. At all times relevant for
choice-of-law purposes respecting these issues, Hague was clearly a
member of the Wisconsin community. Moreover, the insurance
transaction in question was entirely centered in Wisconsin: Hague
lived there; his automobiles were garaged there; the insurance contract was concluded there. Considerations of predictability and comprehensibility, if they have weight, require that the insurance contract be regulated by Wisconsin law. In sum, when assessed in terms
of an instrumental analysis, the position taken by Justice Stevens in
his concurring opinion in Hague is plainly correct: "[T]he Minnesota
courts' decision to apply forum law

. .

.[is] unsound as a matter of

conflicts law, and there is little in this record other than the presumption in favor of the forum's own law to support that decision.
* ." Justice Powell, in his opinion for the dissenters, makes the
same point even more succinctly when he characterizes as "trivial
32
[the] contacts between the forum State and the litigation."
THE ARBITRARY CHOICE OF LAW IN

Hague

If the foregoing analysis is correct, the conclusion is inescapable
that under all three of the general choice-of-law approaches that
have been utilized in the last two centuries in the United States, the
choice of law in Hague was unprincipled and arbitrary. Four of the
eight Justices who participated in the Hague decision in effect accept
this conclusion. Accordingly, the majority in the case results from
Justice Stevens' view that arbitrariness and lack of principle in
choice of law are constitutionally acceptable unless, in the particular
circumstances, the result is in some further and more basic sense
fundamentally unfair. Four members of the Court who were apparently unwilling to accept Justice Stevens' position, however, reached
the conclusion that "Minnesota had a significant aggregation of contacts with the parties and the occurrence, creating state interests,
31.
32.

449 U.S. at 331-32 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 332 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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such that application of its law was neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair."33 How could the plurality reason as it did?
The answer seems to be that the plurality overlooked a fundamental tenet of the choice-of-law methodology they embrace. They
assume that an instrumental methodology is prepared to accept a
choice of law as principled and nonarbitrary in the event of significant contacts or relations between the transaction or occurrence as a
whole and the state whose rule is applied. As already stated, however, it is fundamental to contemporary instrumental choice-of-law
methodology that analysis proceeds issue-by-issue rather than transaction-by-transaction or occurrence-by-oceurrence.3 As Judge Fuld
wrote in Babcock v. Jackson:
Justice, fairness and "the best practical result" .

may best be

achieved by giving controlling effect to the law of the jurisdiction
which, because of its relationship or contact with the occurrence or
the parties, has the greatest concern with the specific issue raised in
the litigation . .

.

As a transitional stage of the shift from the jurisdiction-selecting method of the first Restatement-where d6perage was exceptional-to the instrumental method now dominant in American
choice-of-law thinking-where the analysis proceeds, in principle, issue-by-issue-some courts did adopt a center-of-gravity or groupingof-contacts theory.3 6 This approach sought to determine the legal order with which the transaction or occurrence as a whole was most
closely connected. An approach along these lines, however, is inconsistent with an instrumental analysis: The significance of a contact
with a legal order cannot be evaluated in the abstract. A relationship
that is highly significant where policies respecting compensaton are
at stake may have little or no significance where conduct-regulating
policies or policies relating to the planning of transactions are in
question. As Judge Fuld remarked in Babcock v. Jackson, "[ilt is
hardly necessary to say that Ontario's interest [with respect to the
guest-statute issue] is quite different from what it would have been
33. Id. at 320.
34. See text accompanying notes 27-28 supra.Of course, proceeding issue-by-issue may
involve, in certain situations, the danger of misalliance of incompatible rules. See Pearson v.
Northeastern Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553, 564 (2d Cir. 1962) (Friendly, J., dissenting) (rehearing en banc).
35. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 481, 191 N.E.2d 279, 283, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 749 (1963).
36. Perhaps the best known example of this approach is Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155,
124 N.E.2d 99 (1954) (law applicable to a separation agreement).
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had the issue related to the manner in which'8' the
defendant had been
7
driving his car at the time of the accident.

SOME CONCLUSIONS

Several conclusions flow from the foregoing discussion. The first
is that the result in Hague probably can be justified in Justice Stevens' terms. Even if Minnesota's choice of law is unprincipled.and
arbitrary, the result of its application is doubtless neither so shattering to the defendant nor so unforeseeable, especially given the tendency of some courts to unprincipled and arbitrary behavior in the
conflicts field,38 as to result in fundamental unfairness. This view has
the unattractive quality, however, of accepting Gresham's law where
the constitutional dimensions of choice of law are in issue.
On the other hand, the plurality's position-that an unprincipled or arbitrary choice of law is unconstitutional-requires a reversal in Hague unless the center-of-gravity or grouping-of-contacts
theory is, in the application given it by the Minnesota Supreme
Court, constitutionally acceptable. It would seem constitutionally acceptable for a state to reject, in principle, the issue-by-issue approach utilized by the American instrumental school in favor of an
approach that allowed, in principle, the legal order which is the
transaction's center of gravity to apply its law to the entire controversy. The d~pegage procedure is sufficiently problematical to permit
a legal order to reject its use; for such a legal order a center-ofgravity approach to the transaction or occurrence as a whole is a
rational alternative. And, in situations where several legal orders can
reasonably claim to be the transaction's or occurrence's center of
gravity, any of these could constitutionally apply its law to the situation as a whole. Where a legal order is plainly not the center of
gravity, however, but has a relation with respect to one issue that
may arise in connection with that transaction or occurrence, the
grouping-of-contacts theory cannot rationally justify the application
of that legal order's law. In such a case, the choice of law in question
can be justified, if at all, only in terms of an instrumental analysis.
37. 12 N.Y.2d at 483, 191 N.E.2d at 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750.
38. Compare Savchuk v. Rush, 311 Minn. 480, 272 N.W.2d 888 (1978), rev'd, 444 U.S.
320 (1980) (Minnesota jurisdiction over nonresident driver for accident in Indiana involving
two Indiana residents based on attachment of obligation of defendant's insurance company to
indemnify him) with Cornelison v. Chaney, 16 Cal. 3d 143, 545 P.2d 264, 127 Cal. Rptr. 352
(1976) (California has jurisdiction over defendant trucker in suit brought by California resident whose husband was killed in Nevada accident on ground that trucker was regularly engaged in runs to and from California).
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In the Hague case, Minnesota was plainly not the center of
gravity of the underlying transaction or occurrence. It follows that
application of Minnesota's antistacking rule cannot be constitutionally justified in terms of a grouping-of-contacts approach. Therefore,
unless the application of Minnesota's rule can be justified instrumentally, the choice of law in Hague was unconstitutional under the test
set out by the plurality.
The result reached by the plurality in Hague is thus caused by
their failure to understand the difference between a center-of-gravity
methodology and an instrumental methodology. The coalescing of
these two different approaches explains not only why these four Justices did not find it necessary either to state the precise choice-of-law
issue on which Hague turned or to determine the significance, if any,
of Minnesota's contacts with the occurrence and the parties with respect to that issue, but also how Justice Brennan could expatiate on
Minnesota contacts that had no significance whatsoever for the issue
of contract interpretation on which Hague turned:
Here . . .respondent's bona fide residence in Minnesota was not
the sole contact Minnesota had with this litigation . . . . [I]n connection with her residence in Minnesota, respondent was appointed
personal representative of Mr. Hague's estate by the Registrar of
Probate for the County of Goodhue, Minn. Respondent's residence
and subsequent appointment in Minnesota as personal representative of her late husband's estate constitute a Minnesota contact
which gives Minnesota an interest in respondent's recovery, an interest which the court below identified as full compensation for
"resident accident victims" to keep them "off welfare rolls" and
able "to meet financial obliations." 3 9
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES

If the foregoing is sound, it demonstrates that the Court has
been digging itself into a morass. Is there an alternative?
The Hague decision indicates that two approaches are now explicitly under consideration at the Court: Justice Stevens' view that
the Court should abdicate responsibility for controlling choice of law
except in cases so egregious as to be almost unthinkable; and the
view of the other seven Justices in Hague that the Court should take
each close case and decide for itself whether there is too little or
enough to pass constitutional muster.
39. 449 U.S. at 319 (citation omitted).
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Justice Stevens' refusal to exercise control over choice of law is
ultimately untenable and will inevitably create pressure to develop
alternative devices40 which may or may not be sound. For example,
one way of viewing the decision in Hanson v. Denckla" is to see it as
restricting the jurisdiction of the Florida courts in response to an
egregious choice of law by those courts which the Court was reluctant or unwilling to control directly. As a matter of the development
of jurisdictional thinking, absent the choice-of-law consideration,
Hanson v. Denckla seems out of line with salutary developments beginning with McGee42 in elaborating InternationalShoe's43 fundamental fairness test; if Florida's choice of law in Hanson v. Denckla
were required to satisfy reasonably strict standards, much could be
said in favor of the exercise of jurisdiction by the Florida courts over
the Delaware trustee.
The Supreme Court's failure in Hague to control choice of law
may, however, have desirable repercussions for jurisdictional thinking. Unfettered choice of law in the Hague situation could well lead
the Court to strike down assumptions of jurisdiction over foreign corporations based on the doing of business where the cause arose from
business unrelated to activities of the corporation within the jurisdiction. Minnesota would thus be barred from exercising jurisdiction
over Allstate in the circumstances of the Hague case. In short, as we
have urged elsewhere," jurisdiction based on a foreign corporation's
doing of business locally would be seen as another instance in which
specific but not general jurisdiction would be appropriate. All that
can be said, therefore, for Justice Stevens' view so far as conflictual
thinking is concerned is that it may, by indirection, speed up desirable reform in some areas of jurisdictional practice.
The second approach, apparently adopted by the other seven
Justices of the Hague court, is more attractive in at least acknowledging a potentially significant federal responsibility in the area of
choice of law. Proper regard for the institutional demands on the
Court to provide meaningful review, however, counsels against what
the seven Justices undertook to do in the. Hague case. It is always
40. See, e.g., A. VON MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS
599-601, 614 q.7 (1965); von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdictionto Adjudicate: A Suggested
Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1121, 1174-75 (1966).
41. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
42. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (jurisdiction over foreign
insurance company which mailed reinsurance certificate to local resident).
43. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
44. See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 40 at 1141-44.
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inefficient and unproductive for the Court to decide how much is too
much, or how little is too little, unless it formulates the issues in a
way that requires the lower courts to chew the problem over thoroughly before the Supreme Court considers it. The history, for example, of the Supreme Court's handling of the issue of whether an
employee seeking relief under the F.E.L.A. was engaged in interstate
commerce, 45 and the issue of what constitutes coercion of a confession under the fifth amendment46 is a sorry one. Perhaps the slow
process of elaboration of standards in these two instances was necessary because no good alternative existed. Even if that is so, and regardless of one's own view of the relative importance of elaborating
proper standards of negligence and coercion on the one hand and of
developing standards for the proper functioning of the legal orders of
the federal system on the other, history suggests that the Supreme
Court is unlikely to regard choice of law as worthy of a comparable
effort.
In the case of choice of law another approach seems possible, an
approach that does not abdicate responsibility but seeks to avoid the
pitfalls of case-by-case review of the close cases. The Court could
adopt minimal standards of control but at the same time exercise its
supervisory powers vigorously and insist on application of these standards by the courts being reviewed so that the Court's job of reviewing will be performed less frequently, be better focused, and be measurably more manageable.
In this section are set forth several propositions about constitutional control of choice of law designed to implement such an approach. The propositions are minimal in calling for suppression only
of excessive parochialism or grossly inadequate respect for the interests of other states or of the multistate system. In keeping with the
45. See, e.g., F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT
206-08 (1928). What constitutes negligence under the F.E.L.A. and the Jones Act has also
attracted an undue amount of Supreme Court attention. See, e.g., Rogers v. Missouri Pac.
R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 524 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); memorandum of Frankfurter, J.,
in Kernan v. American Dredging -Co., 355 U.S. 426, 439-41 (1958).
46. See, e.g., P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 602-03 (2d. ed. 1973). See generally
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 504 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Comment: The
Coerced Confession Cases in Search of a Rationale, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 313 (1964).
47. For useful summaries of the Supreme Court's activity in constitutional control of
choice of law and illustration of the extent to which the Court has retreated from the rigorous
control that seemed to be emerging through the 1930's, see R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS
LAW §§ 55-62 (3d ed. 1977); R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
§§ 9.1-9.4 (2d ed. 1980).
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view that wise control has been and should continue to be evolutionary, they take as their premise not the construction of a static set of
principles expected to remain valid for all time but the rather more
manageable task of comparing what has occurred in a particular
case with the accepted norms of the day. They are also manageable
because they require the lower courts to justify departures from
norms rather than allowing them to make the reviewing authority
justify federal interference.
Within the constraints just suggested, three steps can be taken.
Each has a solid body of precedent to support it, at least if one takes
a constructive view of the implications of that precedent. Each is a
small step that can yield great profits. Each is regardful of the demands of the federal system and appropriate as a further step in the
evolution of thinking about improvement of the functioning of that
system.
The proposed steps rest on the constitutional premise that, at a
minimum, the courts of the constituent states of the federal system
must respect the obligations of membership in such a federal system.
This premise, as will become evident, seeks in large measure to reflect values embodied in the full faith and credit clause.4 8 In simplest
form, membership in a federal system ought to involve respect of a
minimal sort for the other members, so that (1) no member will
favor itself, its law or its residents without advancing a principled
basis for doing so, (2) no member will depart from generally accepted or recognized norms of choice of law that may exist from
time to time without giving compelling reasons for doing do, and (3)
no member will refuse to respect a claim for national uniformity,
based on generally accepted or recognized practices of referring to
the law of a particular member in order to achieve uniform treatment of all persons involved in a transaction, without giving compelling reasons for doing so. These three steps are all neutral in the
double sense that unexplained preference of one member's law to another is impermissible and that each member should be prepared, in
a Kantian or Rawlsian fashion, to accept the burdens and advantages of the arrangement as what free and rational states would select in a position of initial equality.
The first step proposed is that any choice-of-law methodology
that without reason or principle weights the scales in favor of the law
of the forum is impermissible. This step treats such a preference as
48.

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § I; see notes 61-64 infra and accompanying text.
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irrational and lawless in a properly functioning federal system.
Removal of this essentially lawless ingredient in the decisional
process would be sound and produce satisfactory results. It is doubtful that the Minnesota Supreme Court could responsibly have applied 'its law in the Hague case except on the basis that it was forum
law. Adoption by the Supreme Court of this first step would put the
burden of responsible, principled decision on the Minnesota court
and free the Supreme Court from doing more than asking whether
the reasons given below show that the Minnesota court is properly
discharging its functions as a supreme court of a member state of a
federal union.4 9 The burden would be shifted; the Supreme Court
would no longer be in the position of seeking to justify a state's highest court's decision; the Court would in a case such as Hague vacate
and remand for a further decision below that would have the burden
of explaining and justifying what had been done. The explanation
could not include reliance on forum law simply because it was forum
law.5 0 The second and third steps would call for response by the state
court to further questions.
49. An example of the efficacy of such a step is F.C.C. v. RCA Communications, Inc.,
346 U.S. 86 (1953), in which the Supreme Court struck down the grant of authority by the
FCC to a radiotelegraph company to open two new international circuits. Although there are
other strands to the opinion, the basic point was that the Commission tried to take the easy
way out. Its mandate was to be guided by the "public interest, convenience, or necessity;"
instead, it was found to have rested its opinion on "a national policy favoring competition."
The Court, quite rightly it seems in this context, held that the Commission could not rest on a
finding that competition was "reasonably feasible" but must find explicitly that the public
interest, convenience or necessity would be served:
To say that national policy without more suffices for authorization of a competing
carrier wherever competition is reasonably feasible would authorize the Commission
to abdicate what would seem to us one of the primary duties imposed on it by
Congress . . . . We think it not inadmissible for the Commission, when it makes
manifest that in so doing it is conscientiously exercising the discretion given it by
Congress, to reach a conclusion whereby authorizations would be granted wherever
competition is reasonably feasible. This is so precisely because the exercise of its
functions gives it accumulating insight not vouchsafed to courts dealing episodically
with the practical problems involved in such determination. Here, however, the conclusion was not based on the Commission's own judgment but rather on the unjustified assumption that it was Congress' judgment that such authorizations are
desirable.
Id. at 95-96.
50. Therefore, it would be impermissible for the forum to justify application of its own
law solely on the ground that it finds its law easier to apply or that it regards its own law as
better law simply because it is its own law. Equally impermissible would be any methodology
arbitrarily weighting the scales in favor of forum law. See, e.g., Currie, Notes on Methods and
Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE L.J. 171, reprintedin B. CURRIE, SELECTED
ESSAYS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 177 (1963).
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The second step can be briefly stated but needs considerable explanation, as the statement itself is somewhat impressionistic: A
court that departs from choice-of-law norms has a burden of adducing persuasive reasons for the departure. The appropriateness of such
an attitude on the part of courts in a federal system hardly requires
extended discussion. What may appear far more difficult is to give
enough concreteness and clarity to the conception of norms to make
the test workable-both as a guide to decision by lower courts and
as a standard for appellate review.
To the extent that the test is expressed abstractly, and without
reference to history and a comparative study of the evolution of
choice-of-law practice in the United States, it appears to pose a serious, perhaps recursive, definitional problem: What is meant by a
norm? The problem may not be as difficult as it may seem. In many
situations the norm will be obvious, as it has been in most of the
cases in which an argument for constitutional control has been made:
The Hague, Clay, 1 Dodge,5 2 Liebingt3 and Dick" cases all exemplify this situation; in Hague, for example, no one can or did dispute
that the norm under any current (or traditional) choice-of-law methodology would be to apply the law of Wisconsin, which was not only
the place of injury, the location of the insurance risk, and the residence of the parties but in the circumstances a state (unlike Minnesota) which clearly had an interest in the degree of protection afforded to persons contracting for insurance. On occasion, the norm
may comprehend alternative acceptable views, as for example Carroll v. Lanza55 in effect did for workmen's compensation, putting application of the workmen's compensation laws either of the place of
employment contract or of the place of injury beyond scrutiny but
leaving any other community, for example the workman's domicile,
to justify application of its law.
Since the step proposed aims at encouraging an attitude of national perspective and responsibility rather than laying down rules
51. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964).
52. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357 (1918).
53. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Liebing, 259 U.S. 209 (1922).
54. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930). Of recent cases, perhaps only Watson
v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954), presents any real difficulty as to
whether there was a single normal choice.
55. 349 U.S. 408 (1955). The Court gave notice that there would no longer be examination of the actual interests of the place of injury; they "are to be weighed not only in the light
of the facts of this case but by the kind of situation presented. For we write not only for this
case and this day alone, but for this type of case." Id. at 413.
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applicable only to particular and precise categories of cases, the
norms involved need not be defined with precision. At an earlier
time, one could say with confidence that the norms were those of the
first Restatement;" the consequence, however, would not have been
that the first Restatement's rules applied so as to exclude any other
choice but simply to require explanation of departures from those
rules. Today, the norms are certainly not as rigid as those once prevailing, but it is not an insurmountable task, in light of the precedents in the Supreme Court, and the evolution of choice-of-law
thinking as evidenced in the cases, the literature, and the second Restatement, to say for any given area what the norms now are.
In light of the difficulty the Hague Court created for itself by
failing to appreciate the distinction between a center-of-gravity approach and a more functional instrumental approach, two separate
stages can be mapped out that should simplify application of this
second step. In almost all situations, 57 no constitutional objection can
be raised if the place that is the center of gravity applies its law. The
first stage of the step, then, is to inquire whether that place's law has
been applied. Thus, in the Hague case, Wisconsin law would be the
norm from which departure would require justification not only because Wisconsin was indicated as the place of accident and the place
where the insurance risk was located but also because other significant relationships, such as the domicile of all the parties at the time
of the accident, were with Wisconsin.
In many situations instrumental approaches may have arrived at
a sufficiently settled conclusion that an additional norm--or possibly
even a norm that supplants the center-of-gravity norm 58 -exists.
Where that is so, the second stage of the step could come into play,
and only departure from that norm would require justification. Thus,
if Minnesota had been the residence of the insured so that Minnesota had a rational basis for invoking its law respecting the validity
56.

RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934); see text accompanying notes 20-21

supra.
57. The only exception would be a case in which a settled contrary norm had developed
under an instrumental approach. See notes 58-59 infra and accompanying text.
58. For example, it is possible today that the norm for interspousal suits in tort is the
common domicile of the parties, at least when the domicile permits suit and the place of injury
does not, and that the place of accident is no longer an acceptable norm even if it were regarded as the center of gravity of the occurrence. See, e.g.. Haumschild v. Continental Cas.
Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 169 (1971). On another view, this situation may be the rare one-rare at least today- in
which no respectable authority would accept thinking in terms of a center of gravity in the
place of accident.
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of antistacking provisions in insurance policies as against, for example, the place of accident's permissive rule, probably no further constitutional scrutiny would have been necessary. 59 But in the Hague
case, as both Justice Stevens' concurring opinion and Justice Powell's dissenting opinion conclude, Minnesota lacked an interest in the
plaintiff as resident or the decedent as employee that would rationally call for applying Minnesota law with respect to the issue in
question. No Minnesota interest requiring the protection of Minnesota policy existed; at best, the application of Minnesota law would
advance the pecuniary interest of a person now a Minnesota resident,
and such parochial pocketbook arguments ought to have no place in
a properly functioning federal system.00 In short, the federal interest
in avoiding the traps, surprises, and forum shopping that may occur
because of the existence of jurisdictional boundaries and varying systems of law justifies requiring Minnesota to give more adequate reasons than it did, or probably could, for the application of Minnesota
law.
The third step may in some cases differ very little from the second step, but, because it is inspired by the national interest in integrating the legal systems of the nation expressed through the full
faith and credit clause, it should be separately articulated. The basic
proposition is that where a "federal interest in national unity"6 1 exists or should be found to exist, a very heavy burden must be met in
order to justify interfering with or departing from that interest. This
step is presumably not involved in the Hague case as probably no
overwhelming interest in national unity can there be made out-at
least in the ways that the interest in national unity has come to be
understood. Good examples of situations in which the interest in national unity has been recognized in the past include the rights of
members of a fraternal benefit society and the obligations of shareholders to contribute equally to pay off the debts of an insolvent
bank.6 2
59. That would clearly be so once the Supreme Court had so ruled in such a case. See
note 57 supra and accompanying text.
60. See, e.g., Trautman, Rule or Reason in Choice of Law: A Comment on Neumeier, 1
VT. L. REV. 1, 19 (1976).
61. 449 U.S. at 323 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
62. Especially illuminating in the history of efforts to invoke the full faith and credit

clause as an integrating force to achieve national unity have been the cases involving assessments against shareholders or members of associations or insurance plans. See A. VON MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, supra note 40, at 1248-50. In the Supreme Court the relevance of the
clause itself has been clear, although the cases have tended to blur the question whether its
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Just where the line comes between treating participants in some
associations equally-all shareholders of certain banks or all persons
insured by fraternal benefit societies-and giving effect to the protective interest of a state that is not the place of incorporation but
usually (unlike Hague) the residence of the participant, cannot be
stated dogmatically, nor can the line be expected to be static. History and sensitivity to the various substantive interests at issue inform the decision about where the line is drawn.
To elaborate on this theme would require a separate article; all
that is required here is to suggest a structure for the ordering and
maturing of a variety of expressions of need for national unity and
integration of the legal systems of the states.83 Where the need for a
impact is to compel respect for judicial proceedings in the state of incorporation seeking to
impose an obligation to pay assessments on all members or to compel respect in some less
precise way for the law of the home state of the organization. Initially a theory of respect for
the judicial proceeding seems to have been dominant, as in Hancock Nat'l Bank v. Farnum,
176 U.S. 640 (1900), and Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243 (1912). In Hartford Life Ins.
Co. v. Ibs, 237 U.S. 662 (1915), decision was rested on the binding effect of a class action, but
the Court also stated that the law of the place of incorporation of a mutual fund must govern
so as not to "[destroy] the very equality the Assessment plan was intended to secure." Id. at
671. On the same day, in a case involving an assessment against members of a fraternal benefit association, Supreme Council of the Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U.S. 531 (1915), perhaps the most delphic of all statements on the subject was made, by Chief Justice White: "[I]f
the laws of Massachusetts were not applicable, the full faith and credit due to the judgment
would require only its enforcement to the extent that it constituted the thing adjudged as
between the parties to the record in the ordinary sense, and on the other hand, if the Massachusetts law applies, the full faith and credit due to the judgment additionally exacts that the
right of the corporation to stand in judgment as to all members as to controversies concerning
the power and duty to levy assessments must be recognized." Id. at 545. The Court in that
case ultimately concluded that Massachusetts law controlled. Although emphasis on the incorporating state's judgment continued to predominate for some time, see, e.g., Chandler v.
Peketz, 297 U.S. 609 (1936) (per curiam); Marin v. Augedahl, 247 U.S. 142 (1918), ultimately full faith and credit has come to be recognized as the appropriate instrument for compelling respect for another state's law, e.g., Order of United Commercial Travelers of Am. v.
Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947) (fraternal benefit association), and for invalidating local procedural impediments to entertaining foreign causes of action, e.g., Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S.
629 (1935) (assessment on bank shareholders); cf. Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951)
(foreign wrongful death action). Justice Frankfurter once attempted a broad survey of the
cases and evidently thought the unifying thread to be the extent to which the Court found a
need for uniformity. See Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 414 (1955) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The cases illustrate considerable disagreement about the situations which require uniformity but very little disagreement that if uniformity is called for, an appropriate instrument
for achieving it is full faith and credit.
63. At one point in his celebrated Cardozo lecture on full faith and credit, Justice Jackson stated: "Always to be kept in mind . . . is that the policy ultimately to be served in
application of the clause is the federal policy of 'a more perfect union' of our legal systems."
Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-the Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45 COLUM. L. REv.
1, 27 (1945). Should the Court undertake explicitly to examine them there already exist fruit-
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nationally unifying solution is identified, only the most compelling
reasons-or careful distinctions"--would suffice to satisfy scrutiny
by the Supreme Court.
It is unnecessary to these proposals to join in the debate over
the constitutional text-due process, full faith and credit, privileges
and immunities, or even the commerce clause-that supports constitutional control of choice of law. At one level, there seems much to
be said for viewing the question of how much is needed before a
state can apply its own law as a due process problem and the question of the circumstances in which a state, even though it has sufficient interest to apply its own law under due process, is required to
defer to the superior interest of another state as a full faith and
credit problem. That appears, for example, to reflect Chief Justice
Stone's view of the situation in the workmen's compensation cases 5
and Justice Black's statements in Watson."6 It seems to provide persuasive basis both for what the Court has done and for what is proposed here.
Another view of the matter would take some of what Justice
Jackson surmised about full faith and credit and explore the potential of that clause alone as the basis for constitutional control. 67 It
may not be farfetched to suppose that the full faith and credit clause
could perform a role for the legal system somewhat analogous to the
one that the commerce clause has come to be understood as playing
for the economic and commercial interests of the states and of the
ful underpinnings for study and growth. See Note, Some Reflections on the "Nationally Unifying" Role of Full Faith and Credit, in A. VON MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, supra note 40, at
1458. Particularly illuminating, for example, might be examination of the implications of the
decision in Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202 (1933), requiring South Carolina to
respect a Georgia decision terminating a father's obligation to support his child. Although it is
by no means clear in the circumstances that the Georgia determination should have been held
conclusive in South Carolina, full faith and credit overcame technical hurdles produced by
great dissimilarity in the procedural arrangements for providing child support; the Supreme
Court, viewing the problem functionally, was quite innovative in integrating the relevant rules
and institutions of Georgia and South Carolina as they came to bear in the particular context.
See A. VON MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, supra note 40, at 1460. Local variations in procedural

detail or substantive right are overcome by federal principles that operate to maintain or facilitate uniformity in legal concepts and thus to promote the orderly establishment and recognition of rights across state boundaries, id. at 1462-63, federal functions that can also be performed of course by federal common law. See text accompanying note 69 infra.
64. See, e.g., Pink v. A.A.A. Highway Express, Inc., 314 U.S. 201 (1941).

65. E.g., Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493
(1939).
66. Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
67.

See note 63 supra.
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nation. In this view, as Justice Jackson suggested, full faith and
credit has a large integrating role to play, fostering unity and uniformity in those areas and for those questions where they are
required.
In general, full faith and credit-perhaps more comfortably and
more obviously than other constitutional text-has the potential occasionally realized in the cases, of alleviating uncertainties created
by state boundaries and by the resulting plurality of legal
frameworks within which human activity is conducted. When activity has been undertaken with obvious relation to and reliance on one
state's jurisprudence, either because the activity has occurred there
or because-as in the shareholder assessment and fraternal benefit
association cases-a relationship of primary concern to that state has
emerged, full faith and credit is available to make that state's solution the national solution. 8
Furthermore, there are more ambitious ways of dealing with
these problems which might be preferable, although in light of the
Court's decision in Hague it seems highly unlikely that the system is
prepared for any such developments. For example, to some extent
what is articulated as constitutional law may on analysis prove to be
federal common law, 69 and nothing said here would be incompatible
with parallel or further development of these principles as federal
common law. The ultimate difference between constitutional law and
federal common law comes to a matter of allocation of function or
separation of powers: Congress can legislate to overcome judicially
created federal law. Although it seems doubtful that Congress would
alter judge-made rules of choice of law under the full faith and
credit clause, its attempt to do so analytically raises the question
whether the Court had been articulating constitutional law or federal
common law. Yet in concrete cases the Court might welcome legislative assistance and conclude that what had seemed initially to be
constitutional law was indeed simply federal common law subject to
correction and improvement by Congress.
Furthermore, the typical operation of constitutional controls as
boundaries on permissible state action can be performed equally well
by federal common law, which often quite appropriately functions to
provide floors or ceilings on state law rather than to supplant it.l °
68.

See A. VoN MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, supra note 40, at 1465.

69. See Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. Rev. 1 (1975).
70. See Trautman, The Relation Between American Conflicts Law and Federal Con-
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Until much more experience with these questions is had, it may be
just as well not to try to define the line between constitutional law
and federal common law.""
In our view the Hague case would best have been left undecided. In particular, the Court's failure to appreciate the differences
between center-of-gravity and instrumental approaches is a disservice. It would be better if the Court could see its way open to abandoning its present attitude of interfering only in outrageous cases in
favor of putting the burden on the states to develop responsible attitudes as member states of the federal community. We have proposed
three steps to implement such an approach. All three steps rely
chiefly on the wisdom of the lower court judges; the basic assumption is that the Supreme Court's role can best be played by requiring
the lower courts to approach choice of law with a less parochial attitude than that of the Minnesota Supreme Court in Hague. The requirement that departures from choice-of-law norms be justified
should bring notable improvement to the whole process of understanding and giving fair scope to the national significance and impact of choice-of-law decisions.

LAW & CONTEMP. PROB., 105, 119 (Spring 1977).
See id. at 114 n.37.

mon Law, 41
71.
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